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“[S]ince wars begin in the minds of men, 
it is in the minds of men that the defenses of 
peace must be constructed.” 
 --UNESCO Constitution-- 
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Abbreviations & Acronyms  
 
4A’s   Availability, Accessibility, Adaptability and Acceptability 
Banjul Charter African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
CADE   UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 
CEDAW  Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women  
CERD   Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination 
CESCR  Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
Children’s Charter African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) 
CRC Committee Committee on the Rights of the Child 
CRC   Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Delors Commission International Commission in Education for the Twenty-first Century 
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECOSOC  United Nations Economic and Social Council 
EFA   Education for All 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
HDI   Human Development Index 
HRC   Human Rights Committee 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
ICL   International Law Commission 
ICRC   International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDP   Internally Displaced Person  
IHL   International Humanitarian Law  
INEE   Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies 
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ISCED   International Standard Classification of Education 
LDC   Least Developed Country 
MDG   Millennium Development Goals 
RtE   Right to Education 
RtPE   Right to Primary Education 
UDHR   Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
UN   United Nations 
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNISDR  UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction  
VCLT   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction 
The discourse on the right to education (‘RtE’) is not always sufficiently nuanced when 
describing the scope and content of the right.
1
 Basic needs are sometimes not differentiated 
from human rights, and the impression one is often left with is that every child can claim a 
place in school today regardless of the circumstances, when in fact the underlying legal 
sources lead to a much more complex conclusion. There is thus a risk that those instances 
where there is a legitimate right to a result, cannot be discerned from those where there is a 
complex matrix consisting of both obligations of conduct and result. Rights holders and 
advocates then run the risk of a devaluation of the right to education, for all, contrary to the 
literature’s good intentions. 
 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (‘UDHR’)2 proclaims: Everyone has the right 
to education.
3
 The international community is politically committed to the fulfillment of 
this promise by 2015 through Millennium
4
 Development Goal (‘MDG’) 25 and the 
Education for All (‘EFA’) campaign.6 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
                                                 
1
See e.g. A/63/500 p. 1 and http://www.ineesite.org/post/about_the_right_to_education_in_emergencies2/ . 
2
 Art. 26. 
3
 For a drafting history of art. 26, see Halvorsen (1990) p 349. 
4
 See the United Nations Millennium Declaration. 
5
 All UN member states are committed to the MDGs. Goal no. 2 is to “[e]nsure that, by 2015, children 
everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling”. Goal no. 3 is 
also relevant. Its target is to "[e]liminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 
2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015". The MDGs do however not mention free and 
compulsory education specifically. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml. 
6
 The goals in the Dakar Framework for Action (‘Dakar 2000’) include free and compulsory primary 
education for all by 2015. The EFA movement is lead by UNESCO and was launched after the after the 
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Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) was the first binding international agreement to recognize the 
right of everyone to education. It imposes a legal obligation on state parties, requiring that 
“[p]rimary education shall be compulsory and available free to all”.7 
 
However, in 2008, 67 million children of primary school age were out of school. Of these 
children, 42 per cent lived in conflict-affected countries
8
 and 43 per in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
9
  796 million people – about 17 per cent of the world population – still lack basic 
literacy skills.
10
 Poverty is a major obstacle to the fulfillment of the RtE and education is an 
important enabling right, which could empower people to claim other rights
11
 and escape 
from poverty.
12
 
 
The right to primary education (‘RtPE’) can be considered an economic right, a social right 
and a cultural right, but in many ways also as a civil and political right, since it is central to 
the full and effective realization of those rights.
13
 It therefore epitomizes the indivisibility 
and interdependence of all human rights.
14
 Today the RtE is recognized in a number of 
international instruments regarding such diverse groups as woman, children, refugees and 
migrants.
15
 In spite of the many legal bases and expressions of political will, the right, is for 
many children – especially in Africa and during emergencies – an unfulfilled promise. The 
                                                                                                                                                    
World Conference on Education for All in 1990, see UNESCO (1994) preface.  It has been criticized for 
focusing on needs rather than rights. See also Beiter (2006) p. 323. 
7
 Art. 13(2)(a). 
8
 EFA (2011) p. 15. 
9
 Ibid p. 5. 10 million children also drop out of school each year in Sub-Saharan Africa, EFA (2011) p. 1. 
10
 Ibid p. 1. 
11
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment (‘CESCR General Comment’) no. 
13 [1]. 
12
 See Dakar (2000) p. 13 and A/RES/S-27/2 [7], where the Assembly noted its conviction that “investments 
in children and the realization of their rights are among the most effective ways to eradicate poverty.” 
13
 Prado (1998) [1]-[4]. 
14
 CESCR General Comment 11 [2] and Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action [5]. 
15
 See Beiter (2006) p. 87. 
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aim of this thesis is to analyze and detail specific state obligations during typical situations 
where the right is not fulfilled, thus untangling the situations where there is a clear and 
immediate right to a result, from those where the obligations are mainly those of conduct. 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
The first chapter contains: an introduction explaining the background for and purpose of 
the thesis; the scope and necessary limitations (1.2); methodological issues – including an 
overview of the main legal sources in the thesis and a note on their value and relevance 
(1.3) and finally research questions (1.4). Chapter 2 details the general right to primary 
education in Africa with an analysis of state obligations based on the ICESCR (2.1); the 
right to primary education under other relevant legal bases (2.2); and possible restrictions 
(2.3). Chapter 3, 4 and 5 contain an analysis of state obligations during the type situations 
of poverty, natural disasters and conflict respectively. Chapter 6 contains the conclusions.  
1.2 Scope and limitations 
The thesis’ principal limitation is its scope. By covering many separate issues, I am forced 
to compromise the depth of detail in the analysis, for the sake of the bigger picture. The 
aim of the thesis is to describe the right to primary education as held by inhabitants of the 
continent of Africa – during emergencies. The normative basis is the ICESCR, but the right 
is also contained in other universal and regional treaties, which have been ratified by a 
majority of African states. I will briefly detail the general RtPE in Africa in chapter 2 
before focusing on three specific type situations of emergency. They are selected to 
comprise a large share of potential emergency situations, but are not an attempt to 
exhaustively define emergencies. 
 
Poverty is considered a type of chronic or silent emergency,
16
 and is intricately linked to 
the more acute emergencies; natural disasters and conflict. They are discussed separately as 
different rules apply and influence state obligations. For the purpose of this thesis the 
following definition of emergency covers the type situations: 
                                                 
16
 Sinclair (2002) p. 23. 
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An emergency is understood as a man-made or natural situation, which has prevented 
the establishment of, destabilized, disorganized, or destroyed the education system, 
thereby disrupting, denying, hindering progress of or delaying the realization of the 
right to education.
17
 
1.2.1 Definition of the right to education for the purpose of this thesis 
The thesis will examine the substantive legal right to education under international law. 
This means the rights created by inter-state agreements and customary international law. I 
take a positivist
18
 approach and aim to describe the state obligations to respect, protect and 
fulfill the RtE as they emanate from this right when interpreted in accordance with the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation.
19
 
 
None of the main legal bases contain a definition of the right to education. The definition in 
the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (‘CADE’) will therefore 
form the basis of my own definition of education for the purpose of this thesis. It 
encompasses "all types and levels of education, (including) access to education, the 
standard and quality of education, and the conditions under which it is given".
20
 This is 
further limited to free and compulsory primary education as expressed in ICESCR art. 
13(2)(a).  
 
Primary education can be negatively defined as what lies between pre-primary and 
secondary education.
21
 The content is further complicated by the use in several legal bases 
                                                 
17
 Inspiration taken from Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC Committee’) Day of General 
Discussion on "The Right of the Child to Education in Emergency Situations" Recommendations 19. 
September 2008 (‘CRC Day of Discussion 2008’) [2], The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: 
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology and Rhoades (2010) p. 9. 
18
 See Hart (1957) p. 594. 
19
 See e.g. Alston (1987) p. 160. 
20
 See art. 1(2) and Beiter (2006) p. 17-21 for more on the definition of education. 
21
 ISCED (1997) p. 22-23 and ISCED (2011) p. 26-27. 
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of the terms fundamental and basic education,
22
 but primary is considered a more narrow 
term and contained in the two former. According to UNESCO,
23
 primary education is 
classified as level 1 and begins between the ages of 5 and 7 and should last for 6 years of 
full time education. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC Committee’) has 
recommended that a school year should conform to the international standard of 180 days 
per year.
24
 The purpose of this thesis, based on the above-mentioned, will be to describe the 
content and extent, of African states’ obligations to provide: 
 
No less than six years of full time, free and compulsory primary education consisting 
of a minimum of 180 days and starting from between the ages of 5 and 7, based on 
rights accruing from international law. 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) considers that 
primary “education must be universal, ensure that the basic learning needs of all children 
are satisfied, and take into account the culture, needs and opportunities of the 
community.”25 The right can also be understood as to contain a social aspect and a freedom 
aspect. The latter is concerned mostly with the freedom to choose how, when and where 
education shall be given and will not be discussed further. The social aspect concerns the 
right to access to education of a certain type and quality, and will be the focus of the 
thesis.
26
 The CESCR has employed a framework of four essential features (4A’s)27 as an 
analytical tool to describe state obligations. The features of availability and accessibility are 
the thesis’ primary focus and are contained in ICESCR art. 13(2). The feature of 
                                                 
22
 In CESCR General Comment 13 [9] primary education is understood as “the most important component of 
basic education”. 
23
 Nearly all states are members of UNESCO, see http://www.unesco.org . Alston claims the travaux 
préparatoires show that the Specialized Agencies, of which UNESCO is one, should add detail to the rights in 
the ICESCR, see art. 23 and Alston (1980) p. 114, see Beiter (2006) p. 233-235. 
24
 CRC/C/TKM/CO/1 [59]. 
25
 CESCR General Comment 13 [9]. 
26
 See Beiter (2006) p. 39 for more on the freedom and social aspects. 
27
 CESCR General Comment 13 [8] and Tomaševski (1999) [50]. 
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adaptability is important for understanding the right in the different type situations, while 
the element of acceptability, which inter alia concerns the quality of education, is crucial to 
the realization of the right, but not central in the discussion as it is a constant requirement
28
 
and prerequisite for the other features. As explained in a later chapter, these 4A’s also form 
a suitable conceptual basis for describing state obligations under the other legal bases in 
chapter 2 and 3. In Chapter 4 and 5 the focus will be on restrictions and international 
humanitarian law (‘IHL’) respectively. 
 
Pre-primary, fundamental and secondary education is important to prepare a child for a life 
of self-sufficiency. The level of protection afforded by international law is however 
weaker, and these other levels are therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. Due to the 
limited space available, procedural rights and enforcement of the right will not be discussed 
either, except where they illustrate substantive issues. The thesis is concerned with the 
human right to education, other fields of law such as refugee and IHL will only be 
mentioned superficially when relevant for the RtE. 
1.3 Methodology  
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) is considered to spell out the 
sources of international law, with treaties, custom and general principles of law considered 
primary sources.
29
 As subsidiary means of interpretation, the Court can also apply judicial 
decisions and “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”.30 The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) arts. 31-33 reflect the generally accepted customary rules 
of treaty interpretation.
31
 Together, these rules and principles form the basis of my analysis.  
 
                                                 
28
 Beiter contends that the two latter are better suited for describing rights in education, rather than the right to 
education. Beiter (2006) p. 476-477. 
29
 Art. 38(1)(a),(b) and (c). 
30
 Art. 38(1)(d). 
31
 Alston (1987) p. 160-161. 
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The substantive right to primary education has a fragmented legal basis, presenting a 
challenge when trying to formulate something general. A rights holder has the right to a 
concept – education – which is contained in two universal32 and two regional33 human 
rights treaties. The ICESCR
34
 is ratified by every African state except five, while the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’)35 is ratified by every African state except 
Somalia. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (‘Children’s 
Charter’)36 has been ratified by 43 out of Africa’s 53 states, while the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Banjul Charter’)37 has been ratified by every African state. In 
the following, an analysis based on the customary rules of treaty interpretation will show 
that the four legal bases do not contain conflicting norms. It is generally accepted that when 
several norms “bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so 
as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations”38 Each treaty – and indeed other 
instruments reflecting state practice
39
 – can help to clarify and update the understanding 
and content of the other, creating one applicable set of rights and obligations.
40
 As the 
normative analysis is based on the ICESCR, it will apply to every state – or resident person 
in that state – which has ratified the Covenant. Where other legal bases are discussed, status 
of ratification must be consulted. 
 
                                                 
32
 It is also contained in the UDHR art. 26. See Annex I. 
33
 See Annex II. 
34
 The RtE is contained in arts. 13 and 14. Non-parties are: Mozambique, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
South Africa and Botswana. 
35
 The RtE is contained in arts. 28 and 29. 
36
 The RtE is contained in art. 11.  
37
 The RtE is contained in art. 17. 
38
 See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), 6 November 2003 [41]. See the “principle of harmonization” in Koskenniemi (2006a) 
[14(4)], and generally regarding treaty interpretation, Fitzmaurice (1951) p. 1-6. 
39
 VCLT art. 31(3)(b) 
40
 VCLT art. 31(3)(c). The International Law Commission (‘ILC’) refers to this as “systemic integration”, see 
Koskenniemi (2006 b) [410]-[428]. 
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In addition to the protection afforded by human rights law, there are relevant rules for the 
RtE contained in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and in a number of instruments 
protecting the non-discrimination
41
 of certain vulnerable groups such as woman, persons 
with disabilities, migrants and refugees and on specific grounds such as racial 
discrimination and specifically – discrimination in education.42 Human rights law applies 
during emergencies and conflict, but IHL will, as a general rule, if there is a case of 
normative conflict, take precedent as lex specialis.
43
 
 
When the term instrument is used in the thesis this can refer to binding treaties, charters, 
covenants and protocols, but also other normative sources such as declarations. The UDHR 
is formally a non-binding declaration. However, parts of it are considered customary 
international law, and some authors claim the right to free and compulsory primary 
education has attained this status.
44
 If this can be established, the customary RtPE would 
impose a legal obligation also on those African states which have not signed the relevant 
treaties. Due to the high level of acceptance of treaty obligations among African countries, 
the content of, and possible status of a customary RtPE, whether based on the UDHR or 
other sources, will not be discussed further. 
 
The thesis will rely on some important soft law
45
 documents as “subsidiary means”46 for 
determining the law. Interpretative comments from treaty supervisory bodies are important 
sources for determining state obligations. There is little authoritative case law available, 
                                                 
41
 These legal bases are not exhaustive. See Beiter (2006) p 87. 
42
 CADE art. 4 and 5. The Convention has not been ratified by many African states, and the substantive 
provisions will not be discussed in detail. For more information see Beiter (2006) p. 243. 
43
 According to the ILC, special law taking priority over general law is justified by the fact that special law 
often is more concrete and takes better account of the particular features of the context. Koskenniemi (2006a) 
[14.2(5)] – [14.5]. 
44
 Beiter (2006) p. 44-46. 
45
 See generally Cassese (2005) p. 196-197. 
46
 See ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(d). 
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and the relevant treaties have relatively weak enforcement mechanisms.
47
 When a treaty 
body – which is entrusted through the treaty to oversee implementation48 – issues its 
interpretation of the rights and obligations emanating from the treaty, it should be 
considered elaboration on already existing obligations incurred by a state through its 
ratification of that treaty. The content of such a statement must thus be analyzed and 
weighed in accordance with the general rules of international sources of law. In practice 
General Comments carry considerable weight and are widely referred to, including by the 
ICJ.
49
 The following three CESCR General Comments will be widely referred to in order to 
elaborate on state obligations; General Comment 3 (1990): The nature of States parties 
obligations (Art. 2, para. 1 of the Covenant) (‘CESCR General Comment 3’); General 
Comment 11 (1999): Plans of action for primary education (article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (‘CESCR General Comment 11’) and 
General Comment 13 (1999): The right to education (article 13 of the Covenant) (‘CESCR 
General Comment 13’).50 
 
Several Special Rapporteurs are referenced in the thesis. They are international experts 
with a mandate from the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) to rapport on certain issues. Their 
reports are authoritative, but not legally binding. 
 
For determining state obligations, two soft law instruments – the Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘Limburg Principles’) and the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
                                                 
47
 Beiter (2006) p. 345-349. 
48
 See ICESCR part IV. Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’) resolution 1985/17 entrusted the 
supervision of the Covenant to the CESCR, See Beiter (2006) p. 348 
49
 See Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004  (‘ICJ Wall Opinion’), [136]. The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (‘African Commission’) made specific reference to 
CESCR General Comments as a means of interpreting state obligations under the Banjul Charter; see SERAC 
v Nigeria (2001) [51] and [63]. See also Beiter (2006) p. 364-371. 
50
 The CESCR has adopted an ‘Outline for drafting general comments’, to ensure consistency. 
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and Cultural Rights (‘Maastricht Guidelines’) – will be referred to in the thesis. They are 
not legally binding instruments, but were written by distinguished scholars – the 
International Commission of Jurists – who were of the opinion that they were describing 
the lex lata, not expanding on applicable law. They are also widely relied on in practice, 
and are considered “an authoritative interpretation of Covenant provisions.”51 
1.4 Research questions 
The thesis will answer the following research questions. 
 
 What is the nature, scope and content of the state’s obligations to provide free and 
compulsory primary education during situations of emergency; poverty, natural 
disaster and conflict? 
 Is the right to primary education subject to restriction, and if so; to what extent? 
 Do African regional instruments afford added protection, in general and during 
emergencies? 
                                                 
51
 Beiter (2006) p. 375. 
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2 The Right to Free and Compulsory Primary Education in Africa 
The value and importance of education is shared across cultures and through history.
52
 It 
has been articulated well, for Africa, by South Africa’s President Tabo Mbeki: 
 
[N]owhere in the world has sustained development been attained without a well-
functioning system of education, without universal and sound primary education[.]
53
 
 
This chapter will analyze the nature, scope and content of the legal bases which protect the 
RtPE in Africa. Most African states are parties to the ICESCR and CRC. The concept of 
human rights in Africa, has however, by some authors, been described as different from 
universal human rights.
54
 The Banjul and Children’s Charters, discussed here, retain much 
from the UDHR, but also reflect some cultural differences, such as the inclusion of 
solidarity rights.
55
 They do not contain a sharp dichotomy between civil and political rights 
on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. They also differ 
from the universal human rights treaties in some of the obligations imposed on individuals, 
and inter alia extending protection to a wider group of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (‘IDP’).56  
                                                 
52
 For the history of the RtE see Beiter (2006) p. 21. 
53
 Dakar (2000) p. 25. 
54
 See e.g. Keetharuth (2009) p. 203 and Okere (1984) p. 145-146. 
55
 See generally Mutua (1995) p. 339. 
56
 For more on African human rights, see Howard (1984). He rejects the notion of African human rights as 
non-universal and based on different concepts (see e.g. p. 173-175). 
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2.1 A normative analysis of the RtPE with the ICESCR art. 13(2)(a) as point of 
departure 
The point of departure for interpreting the ICESCR and other treaties is the VCLT art. 
31(1) which state that a treaty shall be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.” The ICESCR art. 13(1) first sentence affirms that “[t]he States Parties 
to the present Covenant recognize
57
 the right of everyone to education.” The second 
sentence elaborates on the aims of education which includes the full development of the 
human personality, while the third sentence inter alia states that education shall “enable all 
persons to participate effectively in a free society”. 
 
Art. 13 second paragraph litra (a) is the first binding legal treaty obligation to protect the 
right to primary education. It recognizes that “with a view to achieving the full realization 
of this right: (a) [p]rimary education shall be compulsory and available free to all”. The 
verb shall is imperative and normally implies that what is stated is mandatory. It thus 
creates the prima facie obligation under the provision. The content of the terms free and 
compulsory beyond their immediate semantic context will be discussed in later chapters. 
  
There has been some debate as to whether primary education is an immediate obligation or 
subject to the general principle of progressive realization contained in art. 2(1).
58
 The 
CESCR has made statements that could lead to confusion on this issue by inter alia 
remarking that “[t]he obligation to provide primary education for all is an immediate duty 
of all States parties.”59 Alston has however refuted this suggestion by reference to the 
voting history of the Covenant which makes it clear that art. 13(2) should be subject to 
progressive realization.
60
  
                                                 
57
 Alston (1987) p. 185 and see also Coomans (1998) [5]. 
58
 E.g. Coomans considers that free and compulsory primary education should be immediately realized, 
Coomans (1998) [20]. 
59
 CESCR General Comment 13 [51]. 
60
 Alston (1987) p. 186. 
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A contrary interpretation, read with the inclusion of art. 14 and the principle of 
effectiveness
61
 in mind, would be illogical. In its General Comment 13 on the RtE the 
CESCR noted that “[s]tates parties are obliged to prioritize the introduction of compulsory, 
free primary education”62 over other levels of education, thus the obligation to prioritize the 
introduction of primary education is an immediate one.  
 
For a full understanding of the right to education, and the corresponding obligations 
regarding free and compulsory primary education, art. 13 must be read in conjunction
63
 
with arts. 14, 2(1) and 2(2). The first two are relevant for the progressive realization of the 
RtPE while the latter secures non-discrimination in the application of all the provisions in 
the Covenant. 
2.1.1 Progressive realization 
According to the CESCR, art. 2 is “of particular importance to a full understanding of the 
Covenant and must be seen as having a dynamic relationship with all of the other 
provisions.”64 
2.1.1.1 General obligations in the Covenant 
Art. 2 describes the nature of the state’s general legal obligations, which include both 
“obligations of conduct and obligations of result.”65 The obligation of conduct requires 
action reasonably calculated to realize the enjoyment of a particular right, while obligations 
of result require States to achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive 
standard.
66
  
                                                 
61
 See e.g. Lauterpacht (1949) p. 67-69. 
62
 See CESCR General Comment 13 [51]. 
63
 See VCLT art. 31(1). 
64
 CESCR General Comment 3 [1]. 
65
 Ibid [1]-[2]. 
66
 Maastricht Guidelines [7]. 
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2.1.1.2 To take steps…towards progressive realization (art. 2.1) 
Art. 2(1) contains a general provision regarding the progressive realization of the rights in 
the Covenant. The main obligation of result is to take steps "with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized";
67
 by all appropriate means. The 
steps must be taken “within a reasonably short time”68 and be “deliberate, concrete and 
targeted as clearly as possible”.69 The time limit for primary education is further specified 
to two years by art. 14. The steps must be taken “to the maximum of [the state’s] available 
resources”,70 including what is available through “international assistance and co-
operation”.71 
 
Progressive realization means that states “have a specific and continuing obligation ‘to 
move as expeditiously and effectively as possible’ towards the full realization of article 
13”72 This results in a “minimum core obligation73 to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights”. Art. 13(2)(a) read in conjunction 
with art 2(1) transforms the prima facie obligation to provide free and compulsory primary 
education, into a complex set of rights and obligations, which must be examined for each 
specific country and situation.   
2.1.1.3 Immediate obligations 
Two obligations are immediate and apply regardless of the resource situation.
74
 Art. 2(2) 
imposes and unequivocal obligation not to discriminate
75 
 on prohibited grounds. The other 
                                                 
67
 CESCR General Comment 3[9]. 
68
 Ibid [2]. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid [10]. 
71
 Ibid [13]-[14]. 
72
 See CESCR General Comment 13 [44]. 
73
 The CESCR has not yet defined these for the RtE, see Hunt (1998) [6(b)]. 
74
 CESCR General Comment 3 [1]. See also CESCR General Comment nr. 13 [43]. 
75
 CESCR General Comment 20 Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights and CESCR 
General Comment 13 [31]-[37]. 
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obligation is to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps”76 which includes the specific 
requirement for primary education in art. 14.  
2.1.1.4 Specific obligations for primary education (art. 14) 
Art. 14 imposes requirements on states which at the time of becoming a party to the 
Covenant, have not secured free and compulsory primary education for all. They must 
undertake,
77
 within two years of becoming a party, to “work out and adopt a detailed plan 
of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be 
fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.”78 The 
provision establishes a clear obligation of result; a plan meeting these requirements must be 
created within two years.
79
 
2.1.1.5 Retrogressive measures and minimum core obligations 
The CESCR has explained that a: 
 
[s]tate party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of [inter alia] 
the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations 
under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish 
such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être.
80
 
 
These minimum core obligations can be seen as minimum benchmarks which must be met, 
prima facie, regardless of state resources.
81
 Violations of article 13 “may occur through the 
direct action of States parties (acts of commission) or through their failure to take steps 
                                                 
76
 Alston argues that the words reflect an obligation of conduct, Alston (1987) p.165. 
77
 Coomans claims the travaux préparatoires indicate that to “undertake” implies immediate obligations, 
Coomans (1998) [7]. 
78
 Art. 14. 
79
 CESCR General Comment 11 [1] and [8]. 
80
 CESCR General Comment 3 [10] (CESCR’s emphasis). 
81
 Kalantry finds that the CESCR has described five minimum core obligations regarding the RtE, Kalantry 
(2010) p. 272. 
 18 
required by the Covenant (acts of omission).”82 “In order for a State party to be able to 
attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available 
resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are 
at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.”83 Failure to satisfy the minimum obligations described, in spite of exerting 
every effort, is thus not necessarily a violation of the Covenant. As a minimum the state is 
required – in good faith – to fulfill a strict obligation of conduct.84 According to the 
CESCR, the minimum core includes inter alia: 
 
[…]  an obligation: to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and 
programmes on a non-discriminatory basis; to ensure that education conforms to the 
objectives set out in article 13 (1); to provide primary education for all in accordance 
with article 13 (2) (a).
85
 
 
The “assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must 
[…] take account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned.”86 
However, even where “the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation 
remains for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant 
rights under the prevailing circumstances.”87 The minimum core obligation, as an 
obligation of result, is thus individual for each country and resource contingent. Even 
where the level of realization is good, relative to other countries, the minimum obligation 
must progressively increase, requiring the effective use of resources and progress. The 
                                                 
82
 CESCR General Comment 13 [58]. 
83
 CESCR General Comment 3 [10] and Robertson (1994) p. 695 for more regarding the content of 
“resources”. 
84
 See Alston (1987 ) p. 161 for more regarding the “good faith” required. 
85
 CESCR General Comment 13 [57]. Art. 13(2)(a) must be understood as incorporating “progressive 
realization”. 
86
 CESCR General Comment 3 [10]. 
87
 CESCR General Comment 3 [11]. 
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CESCR has stated that it considers the core of the right to health as non-derogable,
88
 thus 
making it likely that this would also apply to other rights.  
2.1.1.6 Benchmarks and indicators 
The obligation incumbent on each state may be different depending on its resources and 
level of development. Arts. 16 and 17 ICESCR obligates states parties to submit reports to 
the CESCR, and the obligation to monitor compliance with,
89
 and non-realization of the 
Covenant is “not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints.”90 The purpose 
of reporting was explained in CESCR General Comment 1: Reporting by States parties, as 
inter alia to effectively evaluate progress. From the need for effective evaluation and 
monitoring, an obligation to identify specific benchmarks – which should be feasible if 
good faith use of maximum resources is carried out - can be inferred. According to the 
CESCR states should set country specific benchmarks, as common global benchmarks are 
of limited use, to evaluate the progress of individual states.
91
 If a state has a current literacy 
rate of 80 per cent, a feasible benchmark would be to reach 90 per cent within a certain 
agreed upon time period.
92
 
 
Likewise, the state has a mandatory duty to submit reports on its progressive 
implementation of primary education. The art. 14 plan emphasizes the need for the 
benchmarks to be “sufficiently detailed so as to ensure the comprehensive realization of the 
right”.93 It must “specifically set out a series of targeted implementation dates for each 
stage of the progressive implementation of the plan.”94 The CESCR has elaborated on the 
process termed scoping in CESCR General Comment no. 14: The right to the highest 
                                                 
88
 CESCR General Comment 14 [47]. Coomans argues that core content (as opposed to core obligation) is the 
essence of the RtE, and should not be country specific, Coomans (1998) [20]. 
89
 See ICESCR Part IV and  Alston (1987) p. 163. 
90
 CESCR General Comment 3 [11]. 
91
 CESCR General Comment 1 [6], and Hunt (1998) [8]-[23]. See also generally INEE (2010). 
92
 Kalantry (2010) p. 292. 
93
 CESCR General Comment 11 [8]. 
94
 Ibid [10]. 
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attainable standard of health.
95
 After identifying indicators, the state sets appropriate 
benchmarks, and during the periodic reports the CESCR and state party scopes, or jointly 
considers the targets, which will be based on the indicators and benchmarks. The state 
party then monitors its progress based on the agreed upon benchmarks, and reports to the 
Committee. 
2.1.2 The nature and content of state obligations 
The CESCR has described art. 13(2) as containing the obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfill
96
 four essential features – or 4A’s:  the availability, accessibility, acceptability and 
adaptability of education
97
 The state must inter alia: 
 
[…] respect the availability of education by not closing private schools; protect the 
accessibility of education by ensuring that third parties, including parents and 
employers, do not stop girls from going to school; [...] and fulfil (provide) the 
availability of education by actively developing a system of schools, including building 
classrooms, delivering programmes, providing teaching materials, training teachers 
and paying them domestically competitive salaries.
 98
 
 
The precise and appropriate application of these terms will depend upon the conditions 
prevailing in a particular State party.
99
 Resources and the security situation will in practice 
greatly impact and differentiate the level of enjoyment of the RtPE. Indicators should show 
the level of realization, grouped into the four interrelated features (4A’s) education 
exhibits.
100
 
 
 
                                                 
95
 CESCR General Comment 14 [58]. 
96
 CESCR General Comment 13 [46]-[47]. 
97
 See generally Tomaševski (2001) p. 12-17. 
98
 CESCR General Comment 13 [50]. 
99
 Ibid [6].  
100
 Hunt (1998) [8]-[9]. 
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2.1.2.1 Availability 
Availability entails that “functioning educational institutions and programmes have to be 
available in sufficient quantity within the jurisdiction of the State party.”101 This requires 
spending on the building of schools and training of teachers, and for full realization, would 
entail inter alia “buildings or other protection from the elements, […] trained teachers 
receiving domestically competitive salaries, teaching materials, and so on […]”.102 It also 
contains the requirement of compulsory attendance. This element is affirmed by art. 
13(2)(e)
103
 which imposes an “obligation to pursue actively the ‘development of a system 
of schools at all levels’ [and] reinforces the principal responsibility of States parties to 
ensure the direct provision of the right to education in most circumstances.”104 
2.1.2.2 Accessibility 
Accessibility contains three overlapping dimensions. Access to education cannot be denied 
on at discriminatory basis. The non-discrimination
105
 provision in art 2(2)
106
 applies 
immediately, and education must be accessible, “in law and fact, without discrimination on 
any of the prohibited grounds” which are on account of “race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. 
All existing facilities must be available without discrimination, even if the number of 
schools does not match the number of students. This requires immediate legislation to 
eliminate de jure discrimination.
107
 Unfortunately, discrimination is one of the biggest 
                                                 
101
 CESCR General Comment 13 [6(a)]. 
102
 Ibid. 
103
 See Beiter (2006) p. 530-532. 
104
 CESCR General Comment 13 [25]. 
105
 See CADE art. 1.1 for a definition of “discrimination in education.” 
106
 Art. 2(3) contains a narrow exception for non-nationals. The CESCR, however, considers the RtE to also 
extend to non-nationals, in practice often refugees and IDPs, see CESCR General Comment 13[34], and [31] 
which looks to the CRC. CRC art. 2 forbids nationality-based discrimination. 
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 Limburg Principles [37]. 
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obstacles to fulfillment of the RtE. Indicators should therefore be disaggregated to show the 
level of realization for vulnerable groups such as IDPs and rural woman. 
 
Economic accessibility entails that primary education shall be available and free to all.
108
 
The semantic content of the term free seems at first straight forward; there shall be no 
school fees. But in practice, the line between direct and indirect costs can be difficult to 
draw, and the CESCR has not defined these limits.
109
 
 
Physical access exemplifies indirect costs, and entails that the school must be accessible 
either geographically or via modern technology. This means, since primary education shall 
be free, that the cost of travel to the school must be kept to a minimum. 
2.1.2.3 Acceptability 
Acceptability refers to the form and substance of education, and entails that e.g. curricula 
and teaching methods “have to be acceptable (e.g. relevant, culturally appropriate and of 
good quality.”110 The objectives of education contained in art. 13(1) are also included, but 
can be difficult to measure. When trying to provide accelerated programs which ensure 
school places, logistical and other problems arise regarding the quality of teaching. In 
Africa, many pupils go through years of schooling without acquiring the necessary skills 
such as literacy and numeracy, due to the poor quality of teaching and teaching materials. 
The quality of education is thus a crucial and constant prerequisite for the other features to 
have practical value. 
2.1.2.4 Adaptability 
Adaptability means that education must be “flexible so it can adapt to the needs of 
changing societies and communities and respond to the needs of students within their 
                                                 
108
 CESCR General Comment.13 [6(b)]. 
109
 CESCR General Comment 11 [7]. 
110
 CESCR General Comment 13 [6(c)]. 
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diverse social and cultural settings.”111 This adaptability extends to emergency situations, 
which severely impacts the needs of society, and requires the state to have a plan and 
appropriate measures for how to handle such situations. Indicators include minimum age of 
employment and the presence of armed conflict.
112
 
2.2 Resolving the different legal bases – establishing a coherent RtE for the 
further discussion 
In addition to the ICESCR, three treaties protect the substantive RtE in Africa. In what way 
do these three substantive legal bases protect the right to primary education? 
2.2.1 The CRC 
CRC arts. 28 and 29 contain the right to education. According to the travaux préparatoires, 
the intended purpose of the wording of art. 28(1) was to reflect the same standard and 
rights contained in ICESCR art. 13(2) read in conjunction with the Covenant’s art. 2(1).113 
Art. 29 adds a qualitative dimension
114
 to the RtE, beyond that contained in the ICESCR.  
 
States shall according to art. 28(1)(a) make primary education compulsory and available 
free to all. Primary education is subject to progressive realization in both the main article 
and art. 4. This double emphasis together with the use of the words “shall make”, offers a 
weaker degree of progressive realization,
115
 making the ICESCR the common benchmark 
for states bound by both treaties. The CRC Committee has stated that CESCR General 
Comments are complimentary to its own,
116
 while the CESCR has emphasized that it 
encourages a “contemporary interpretation of article 13 (1)”117 in light of other 
international legal developments. There is thus a large degree of coherence between the 
                                                 
111
 CESCR General Comment 13 [6(d)]. 
112
 De Beco (2009) p. 20. 
113
 See Detrich (1999) p. 475-480. 
114
 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment (‘CRC General Comment’) 1 [2]. 
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two treaties. The CRC Committee looks to the CESCR for interpretative guidance, making 
the analytical features (4A’s) suitable for describing state obligations also under the CRC. 
2.2.2 The Children’s Charter 
The Children’s Charter is modeled on the CRC,118 but contains some novel provisions and 
slight differences.
119
 Art. 11(1) states that: Every child shall have the right to an education. 
This initial obligation is modified by art. 11(3) which instructs that states parties “shall take 
all appropriate measures with a view to achieving the full realization” in particular “(a) 
provide free and compulsory basic education.” As the wording is slightly different, the 
level of realization required might also be different.
120
 States are obligated, “in accordance 
with their means and national conditions the
121
 all appropriate measures”, to assist with 
inter alia educational materials and programmes.
122
 The similarity to the CRC, and the 
principle of effectiveness, leads me to conclude that the right to primary education – a 
narrower term than basic – in the Children’s Charter is also subject to a level of progressive 
realization, not unlike that in the CRC and ICESCR. The Charter’s practical importance 
has, however, so far been limited – perhaps influenced by it taking 10 years to enter into 
force, compared to the CRC, which took one.
123
 
2.2.3 The Banjul Charter 
The Banjul Charter contains a short reference to education in art. 17(1) where it states: 
Every individual shall have the right to education. The Charter does not specifically 
guarantee primary education, nor does it make reference to it being free or compulsory. It 
also does not contain a specific provision on progressive realization, but includes a non-
                                                 
118
 For a general comparison, see Beiter (2006) p. 216 and Gose (2002). 
119
 E.g Article 31: Responsibility of the Child, see also Chirwa (2002) p. 169. 
120
 Beiter contends that the absence of ”to make” which is found in the CRC, means primary education is not 
subject to progressive realization, Beiter (2006) p. 218. Gose claims the Charter follows the progressive 
realization of the CRC, Gose (2002) p. 114. 
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discrimination provision in art. 2. The jurisprudence of the African Commission is not 
conclusive, but supports the interpretation that progressive realization was not intended.
124
 
 
The objective reading of the terms in the provision and the absence of other sources, means 
it is unlikely that the Banjul Charter can be invoked to claim a right to free and compulsory 
primary education.
125
 Should the African Commission expand on the right through 
dynamic interpretation in the future, this might change.
126
  
2.2.4 Summary 
The Banjul Charter does not explicitly cover primary education and will therefore not be 
discussed in detail in the following. The CRC and Children’s Charter contain a substantive 
right to primary education, which shall be progressively realized. The similarities between 
the treaties and the principle of the effective protection of human rights, where the strictest 
provision prevails, leads to the ICESCR being the logical point of departure for describing 
state obligations for African states and the corresponding right to primary education for its 
residents.
127
 
2.3 Restrictions to the right to education 
Restrictions on rights can take many forms and the application of terms is not always 
consistent. Derogation, limitation, restriction and exception are all terms which to some 
extent are used interchangeably. A derogation clause such as ICCPR art. 4 can only be 
applied in exceptional circumstances, while claw back clauses
128
 and limitation clauses
129
 
such as ICESCR art. 4 are applicable under normal situations. Such clauses reflect the need 
for a flexible system and the weighing and balancing of the rights of the individual against 
the needs of society. They are also possible tools for misuse and abuse. Even where not 
                                                 
124
 See Odinkalu (2001) p. 362-369. 
125
 See VCLT art. 31. 
126
 See Banjul Charter art. 61 and Coomans (2003) p. 757-760. 
127
 VCLT art. 31(1)(c). 
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expressly stated, restrictions on rights can occur through a normative conflict with other 
rights and obligations contained in different sources of law.
130
 Derogation measures also 
have a legal basis in general principles of law such as Force Majeur and Neccesity.
131
 Any 
conflict of norms must be resolved on the basis of the VCLT.
132
 The following chapter will 
analyze if, and to what extent, primary education is subject to restrictions. 
2.3.1 Limitations to the RtPE with the ICESCR art. 4 as point of departure 
ICESCR art. 4 contains a general, but narrow limitation clause which was intended for 
situations not covered by art. 2(1).
133
 Limitations to the RtPE must be “determined by law 
only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of [this right] and solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”134 The CESCR has not 
elaborated much on the provision except emphasizing that its primary intent is to be 
protective
135
 of individual rights, rather than permissive in allowing states to apply 
limitations.
136
 This means that “a State party which closes a university or other educational 
institution on grounds such as national security or the preservation of public order”137 has 
the burden of proving that measures taken are in accordance with the 4 cumulative 
requirements which can be deduced from art. 4. The provision will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.4.1. 
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2.3.1.1 Application of art. 4 limitations to the three other legal bases 
None of the three legal bases contain a general limitation clause. The principle of pacta 
sunt servanda
138
 would thus dictate that states should be bound by the obligations in the 
treaties.
139
 However, the treaties must be viewed as a part of a larger integrated system – 
International law. Restriction could thus be possible based on analogous application.  
 
I – CRC  
The CRC places restrictions on some rights
140
 but not the right to education. The absence 
of a limitation clause, and the approach to treaty interpretation in VCLT art. 31(1) leads to 
the prima facie conclusion that limitations should not be permitted. The close similarities 
between the ICESCR and CRC on the subject of education, however, favour a common 
solution. The systemic integration or harmonization approach to treaty interpretation, 
described by the International Law Commission,
141
 supports this interpretation, as does the 
CRC Committee’s focus on the ICESCR. Art. 4 consistent limitations should therefore not 
be considered violations of the CRC. 
 
II – The Children’s Charter 
The Children’s Charter contains no general limitation clause and is almost identical in 
structure to the CRC. The conclusion there, regarding limitations to the RtPE, also applies 
to the Charter.
142
 
 
III – The Banjul Charter  
The Banjul Charter contains several wide claw back clauses which permit limitations on 
rights for a number of reasons under normal circumstances.
143
 It does not contain one for 
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the RtE, and it is therefore unlikely that specific limitations are allowed. As the treaty does 
not specifically protect primary education, possible limitations will not be discussed 
further. 
2.3.2 Derogation from the right to education with the ICESCR as point of 
departure 
Is derogation from the RtPE permitted? According to the HRC, derogation “is clearly 
distinct from restrictions or limitations”,144 which are allowed during normal times. 
Derogation can be understood as the “complete or partial elimination [of a right or an 
aspect of a right] as an international obligation
145
 in times of emergency which ‘threatens 
the life of the nation.”146 
 
As the ICESCR does not contain a derogation clause
147
 the permissibility of possible 
derogation measures must be based on analogy from ICCPR art. 4
148
 or on general 
principles of international law.
149
 Legal theory is not clear on the issue of derogation where 
the treaty does not expressly regulate it.
150
 The former Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers considers the concept of derogation to have its legal 
bases in either treaty, or inter alia the general principles of Force Majeur and Necessity. As 
grounds for invocation, these legal bases are on a gliding scale, with statutory derogation 
requiring the least serious situation, followed by Force Majeur and Necessity. 
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2.3.2.1 Derogation based on analogy from ICCPR art. 4 
The CESCR has noted that “because core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to 
exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster.”151 However, the HRC has 
specified that “[c]onceptually, the qualification of a [ICCPR] provision as a non-derogable 
one does not mean that no limitations or restrictions would ever be justified.”152 The 
“permissibility of restrictions is independent of the issue of derogability.”153  
 
Placing derogation under procedural requirements as in the ICCPR
154
 formally restricts the 
freedom to misuse power. However, in practice it does not always function as an effective 
check. Derogation reflects the pragmatism of the real world and is in itself negative as it 
restricts rights otherwise due under normal circumstances. The HRC has explained that 
“measures derogating from the provisions of the [ICCPR] must be of an exceptional and 
temporary nature [and] two fundamental conditions must be met: the situation must amount 
to a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and the State party must have 
officially proclaimed a state of emergency.”155 
 
Arguments in favour of permitting derogation from human rights treaties which do not 
contain such a clause “highlight that this purpose could, for example, justify derogations 
from [...] children’s rights to education by closing schools for a limited period of time in 
order to protect their right to life and health in the aftermath of a severe natural disaster. 
The right to education would be derogated from in order to protect the ‘more essential’ 
right to life.”156 
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The rights in the ICESCR including the RtE are less compelling to restrict during 
emergencies, and the general obligation in art. 2(1) means the rights have a more “flexible 
and accommodating nature”.157 The ICJ has noted that restrictions to economic, social and 
cultural rights during Israel’s derogation under a state of emergency, did not meet the 
requirements in art. 4 ICESCR, of being “solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society.”158 The Court thus seems to consider the limitation 
provision in art. 4 as the appropriate measure to restrict economic, social and cultural rights 
also during emergencies.
159
 In conclusion; restriction to the right to education during 
emergencies should be consistent with the requirements in ICESCR art. 4 or be based on 
general principles of law. 
2.3.2.2 Analogous application of ICCPR art. 4 to the three other legal bases 
The CRC does not contain a derogation clause and the CRC Committee has stated “that the 
implementation of the right of the child to education in emergency situations must meet the 
requirements set out in articles 28 and 29 of the Convention without limitation.”160 The 
inclusion of a specific reference to IHL in the CRC, makes derogation from the RtPE 
during emergencies less likely. Possible restrictions during emergencies would have to be 
based on a different basis than analogous application of art. 4 ICCPR. 
 
 The Children’s Charter also does not contain a derogation clause, and due to the 
similarities to the CRC, the conclusion is the same. 
 
 The Banjul Charter does not contain a derogation clause, and the African 
Commission has explicitly stated that the Charter “does not allow for states parties to 
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derogate from their treaty obligations during emergency situations.”161 As it does most 
likely not protect the RtPE, it will however not be discussed further. 
2.3.3 Derogation based on general principles of law  
Emergency situations will impact the enjoyment of rights, and from a practical point of 
view, suspending some rights momentarily; to protect more fundamental rights is 
understandable. It is important to distinguish between situations where a state incurs 
international responsibility and where it does not, and apply any restrictions or exceptions 
narrowly. Although human rights are not confined solely to the sphere of inter-state 
relations,
162
 rules on state responsibility and in particular the two principles of Necessity 
and Force Majeur, are relevant.
163
 Both principles are based on the “assumption that the 
non-performance of a legal duty can be justified only where there is impossibility
164
 of 
proceeding by any other method than the one contrary to law.”165 There might thus be 
situations which are so grave that they require action in violation of statutory derogation 
provisions and substantive rights, but which are still legal based on general principles of 
law. There are also situations – typically natural disasters – where the state is legitimately 
unable to fulfill its obligations, for a certain amount of time. The following principles could 
absolve a state of its responsibility to fulfill its obligations temporarily. 
2.3.3.1 Force Majeur 
Force Majeur is codified in the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (‘Draft Articles’) art. 23. A wrongful act is precluded if it is due to an: 
1 irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, 
2 beyond the control of the State, 
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3 making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. 
 
The state is still responsible if the situation can be attributed in whole or part to conduct of 
the state
166
 or the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring.
167
 Force Majeur 
differs from the situations of distress and necessity in that the state conduct is involuntary 
or does not involve an element of free will.
168
 During an emergency, “situations can arise in 
which it is impossible to protect certain rights.”169  If an earthquake has shattered a city 
resulting in complete chaos, it may thus be materially impossible to fulfill the right to 
education for a limited amount of time – without this constituting a breach of the state’s 
obligations. 
2.3.3.2 Necessity 
Necessity is codified in the Draft Articles art. 24. The principle is formulated negatively, 
and may not be invoked as grounds for precluding the wrongfulness of an obligation unless 
it is:  
a) the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
imminent peril;
170
 and 
b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which 
the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
171
  
 
Necessity can in no case be invoked if:  
1. the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking 
necessity;
172
 or  
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2. the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.173 
 
The ICJ commented on the contents of the ILC Draft Articles in the Wall-opinion and 
made reference to a prior case where it explained that necessity “can only be accepted on 
an exceptional basis”. It remarked that the state of necessity is recognized in customary 
international law, but it “can only be invoked under certain strictly defined conditions 
which must be cumulatively satisfied; and the State concerned is not the sole judge of 
whether those conditions have been met”174 
2.3.4 Summary  
In short; restrictions to the RtPE are possible under specific and narrow circumstances. The 
most likely justification would be Force Majeur or Necessity, with ICESCR art. 4 a less 
likely option. 
2.4 Conclusions 
The RtPE contained in the ICESCR is suitable for describing state obligations under the 
four legal bases. In the following chapter, the 4A’s will be used to analyze state obligations 
during poverty. Restrictions to the RtE are conceivable in a narrow set of circumstances 
and will be the focus for describing state obligations in chapter 4. In chapter, 5 IHL is an 
important and additional factor for describing state obligations. 
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3 The right to education during poverty 
 
The Committee is concerned about the discrimination against women, migrants, IDPs, 
poor people, disabled people and persons affected with HIV/AIDS who suffer from 
inadequate access to basic education […] The Committee notes with concern that: (a) 
indicators for education in the State party are very low; (b) the illiteracy rate among 
people over 15 years is very high; (c) children from poor families, girls, children with 
disabilities, victims of mine accidents and children living in both urban and remote 
rural areas have limited access to education […]175 
 
The silent emergency of poverty impacts millions of African children. 51 per cent of the 
population in Sub-Sahara Africa live on less than 2 dollars a day
176
 and 33 of the 48 Least 
Developed Countries (‘LDC’) are on the continent.177 Poverty can last for generations or be 
caused by a sudden financial crisis. It is often the result, and sometimes also the cause – of 
some of the emergencies described in the following chapters. As a result of the current 
crisis, “Sub-Saharan Africa faces a potential loss of around US$4.6 billion annually in 
financing for education in 2009 and 2010, equivalent to a 10% reduction in spending per 
primary school pupil.”178  
 
What obligations does a state have where it does not have revenue to finance basic 
services, and where unemployment is the norm for a majority of the population? This 
chapter is based on the assumption that primary education is not provided to all children 
and will analyze state obligations during chronic poverty and financial crises. 
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The ICESCR art. 13(2)(a) imposes on states the prima facie obligation to provide 
compulsory primary education, free of charge to all children, subject to their individual 
level of development and progressive realization. 
 
3.1 Progressive realization during poverty 
Art. 2(1) contains four elements. It requires states to: 
 
1. “[T]ake steps […] by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures”. 
 
The constitution of Congo guarantees free and compulsory education, but no free schools 
exist. This exemplifies the problem of de jure and de facto adherence, and also why 
legislation is necessary where existing laws are in violation of the Covenant.
179
 It is 
however not sufficient,
 
unless backed up by political and financial decisions, including 
judiciary means of enforcement, which result in the building of schools, hiring of teachers 
and provision of pencils and paper.
180
  As a minimum, the right to free and compulsory 
primary education would require legislation ensuring that the minimum age of employment 
is higher than the age for compulsory school attendance. The recruitment of children under 
the age of 15 into armed forces must also be forbidden, as the alternative would in effect 
not make attendance compulsory. Legislation should also guarantee that existing school 
facilities are compulsory and available on a non-discriminatory basis, where they exist. 
 
2. The steps must be made “to the maximum of [the state’s] available resources,” 
including the resources coming from “international assistance181 and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical”.  
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The formulation is the basis for resource constraints being considered a legitimate obstacle, 
and justification for the lack of immediate realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the RtE. When the state is poor, this obligation is one of conduct, but with 
benchmarks of result to work against. 
 
The CESCR has competence to judge objectively if state conduct meets the good faith 
maximum use of available resources. In this evaluation account will be taken of 
international assistance, which could include providing teachers and material, and financial 
resources.
182
 Even where poverty persists, and there is no increase in resources, progress 
must be made through the effective use of what is available.
183
 
 
3. The steps should aim to “achieve progressively”.  
The words must be read in good faith and mean that intentional retrogressive measures are 
not permitted. The progress must be measured separately, and objectively, for each state 
compared to its set benchmarks.
184
 
 
4.  “[T]he full realization” 
Not reaching this obligation of result immediately is not necessarily a violation of the RtE, 
but one could question the appropriateness of the term fulfill to the situation. The state is 
fulfilling obligations of conduct, but in relation to the rights holders they are only partially 
respecting and protecting the right, and for all practical purposes from a rights holder’s 
perspective, denying it. An alternative term to describe the situation is a state’s “failure to 
comply” with its obligations.185 Eventually, full realization means free and compulsory 
primary education for all, and the imposed obligations of conduct should, if fulfilled in 
good faith, eventually lead to it. 
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3.1.1 Identifying violations of the Covenant 
According to the CESCR “[v]iolations of article 13 may occur through the direct action of 
States parties (acts of commission) or through their failure to take steps required by the 
Covenant (acts of omission).”186 The CESCR differentiates between cases where the state 
is unwilling or unable to meet its obligations.
187
 In the latter case, the burden of proving 
that it has met its obligation of conduct rests on the state. Although an effort of good faith 
is required, the state has a margin of discretion “in selecting the means for carrying out its 
objects,”188 and “factors beyond [the state’s] reasonable control may adversely affect its 
capacity to implement particular rights.”189 
3.1.1.1 Non-progress and retrogressive measures 
The CESCR has stated that “any deliberately retrogressive measures […] would need to be 
fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in 
the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.”190 This would mean for a 
retrogressive measure in relation to education to be permitted; that the diversion of 
resources to the realization of other human rights, would have to objectively entail a higher 
utilitarian value, and simultaneously maximum use of, available resources. 
 
During chronic poverty it is difficult to imagine decrease in education spending, teacher 
pay or reintroducing school fees being permitted. During sudden crises, there is still an 
obligation to seek assistance. The assessment should require an objective minimum budget 
allocation to meet the good faith standard, and priority to primary education. 
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3.1.1.2 Failure to adopt a plan and report on progress 
Art. 14 imposes on states to undertake “within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed 
plan of action”. The two year limit is a clear obligation of result, and should be interpreted 
as within two years “of the Covenant's entry into force of the State concerned, or within 
two years of a subsequent change in circumstances which has led to the nonobservance of 
the relevant obligation.”191 In spite of this clear obligation, “a number of States parties have 
neither drafted nor implemented a plan of action for free and compulsory primary 
education.”192 The obligation is also a continuing one, and applies to those states that did 
not meet the initial two year requirement. It also applies if a sudden occurrence like a 
natural disaster or conflict were to disrupt the progress made, obligating the state to adopt a 
new plan.
193
 The plan should aim for the progressive implementation of primary “education 
free of charge for all.”194 In addition the provision specifies the target date to be “within a 
reasonable number of years”195 and include targeted implementation dates. The CESCR has 
not elaborated further on the content of the term “targeted implementations dates”.196 But 
as in any treaty obligation, good faith is required and the CESCR has authority on a case by 
case basis to determine whether or not the obligation is fulfilled. 
 
As art. 14 applies “almost by definition, to situations characterized by inadequate financial 
resources”,197 the state can not absolve itself of the obligation to adopt a plan for primary 
education due to resource constraints. The CESCR regards it an obligation on the state to 
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seek assistance,
198
 although it is unlikely that a legal obligation to assist can be imposed on 
other states.
199
 
 
ICESCR art. 16 and 17 require states to periodically report on their progress. In spite of this 
clear obligation, by 2007, only 20 out of 47 African states had submitted a report.
200
 The 
revised general guidelines regarding the form and contents of reports
201
 include questions 
regarding indicators such as; statistics on enrollment, percentage of budget spent on 
education, identifying vulnerable groups, laws or policies having negative effect and the 
role of international assistance in the realization of the right. It is conducive to group these 
indicators into the 4A’s.202 
3.2 State obligations during chronic poverty 
During chronic poverty, the constant obligation to work towards realization through the 
setting of higher benchmarks must be emphasized; satisfying the minimum core obligation 
is not sufficient. 
3.2.1 Availability 
Availability primarily concerns the number of school places and compulsory attendance.   
3.2.1.1 Sufficient numbers of schools and teachers 
During poverty, the progressive realization requirement is an obligation of conduct which 
requires “equitable and effective use of and access to”203 available resources. As an 
objective minimum, six per cent of a country’s GNP should be allocated for education, 
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with the primary level a priority.
204
 The EFA fast track initiative, which supports 25 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, will often require 20 per cent of the state budget allocated 
for education, in exchange for additional funding.
205
 Where resources are severely lacking 
there will not be a school place for every child. If monitoring shows retrogression or non-
progress, the state must justify this by reference to an objective minimum standard or its 
higher benchmarks, and seek international assistance. 
In Zaire in the 1980’s, only two per cent of the national budget was earmarked for 
education. 75 per cent of the school age population failed to attend school, while the 
Zairian government abolished free education and had no plan to reintroduce it. The CESCR 
found that the failure to secure “primary education free of charge was in contravention of 
articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant”206 – two per cent did not meet the good faith 
requirement. Resource constraints can also be a disguise for lack of political will. In 
Nigeria, the government “bought 18 […] tanks as part of $150 million deal – equivalent to 
over half of the total national expenditure on basic education.
207
 More recently, a new 
national stadium in Abuja was constructed for more than the total basic education 
budget.”208 
3.2.1.2 Compulsory attendance 
The term compulsory implies the negation of free will. There shall be no choice for the 
child, parent or guardian whether or not to attend school
209
  – what is compulsory must be 
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abided by. To give this legal effect
210
 laws must be adopted with minimum age of 
employment higher than primary school age.
211
 As a minimum, legislation making the 
existing school places available and compulsory should be required, but full compulsory 
education for all is dependent on the availability of free school facilities. Conversely, in 
many countries education is compulsory by law, but facilities do not exist. In these 
situations the government has an even higher benchmark to strive for, and this should be 
reflected in fiscal policy. 
3.2.2 Accessibility 
Accessibility contains the dimensions of free, non-discrimination and geographic 
proximity. 
3.2.2.1 Free 
Free means no school fees.
212
 It also covers more indirect costs such as school uniforms 
and materials. According to the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, the 
price of school textbooks and uniforms can vary between less than three, and more than 30 
per cent of a family’s budget.213 In 2006 primary education was only free in three countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa; in seven countries over 30% of children never even started 
school.
214
 Violations of art. 13 include “the failure to introduce, as a matter of priority, 
primary education which is compulsory and available free to all.
215
 As a matter of priority, 
must entail that if limited resources should be allocated, in a state budget, non-violation of 
the article requires spending directed at providing everyone with primary education, before 
resources are allocated to secondary or higher education. States thus have clear quantifiable 
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obligations regarding their resource and budget allocations. Even in times of severe 
resources constraints and in recession, low cost programmes must be adopted.
216
 
3.2.2.2 Non-discrimination 
The CESCR has identified violations of article 13 as including: 
 
the introduction or failure to repeal legislation which discriminates against 
individuals or groups, on any of the prohibited grounds, in the field of education; the 
failure to take measures which address de facto educational discrimination;
217
 
 
Access to existing educational institutions must be non-discriminatory, and where school 
fees are in existence; this can be de facto discrimination as boys are prioritized while girls 
work in the home. Discrimination can take on many forms, and is protected through the 
immediate obligation in art. 2(2). The inclusion of “other status” indicates that this list is 
not exhaustive and the CESCR has extended the term to cover inter alia IDPs, HIV 
positive, rural people and asylum seekers. Discrimination “must be eliminated both 
formally and substantively[.][…] Eliminating discrimination in practice requires paying 
sufficient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice 
instead of merely comparing the formal treatment of individuals in similar situations.”218 
There is a specific obligation to monitor compliance with art. 2(2)
 219
 and resources must be 
allocated to ameliorate factual differences, so that regions which are comparatively worse 
off see progress. Such affirmative action measures are sometimes required to ensure 
equality.
220
 Woman, minorities, and linguistic groups are examples of groups who may 
need such measures. 
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3.3 State obligations during financial crises 
Where sudden financial crises occur, the state must adapt to a new resource situation. The 
total amount of aid and tax base may decrease, leading to tough fiscal policy choices and de 
facto retrogressive measures. 
3.3.1 Adaptability 
Adaptability is important during transitional and suddenly changing situations. It can be 
seen as having an integrated relationship to the other essential features. The state has a 
continuous duty to asses and report, and set benchmarks. If it does not meet its agreed upon 
benchmarks, it must be determined if maximum resources have been spent in good faith; if 
the action and results are due to lack of will or capacity, and if it constitutes retrogression 
or a retrogressive measure. Clearly, reintroducing school fees or discriminatory policies, 
are deliberately retrogressive measures, and a breach of the state’s obligations. Resources 
must be prioritized and the state must provide what it can through inter alia informal 
schooling, outdoors. At a minimum, the plan should address how to cope with the resource 
situation, and how to move progressively out of it. 
3.3.2 Acceptability 
That education is of a certain minimum quality is a constant requirement, and prerequisite 
for the other essential features. It can be difficult to measure, but is monitored through 
indicators such as student-teacher ratio and literacy upon completion. The quality can often 
be at odds with the availability of education, as illustrated by the situation in Liberia where: 
 
many children and youth (i.e. children aged 14 to 18 years) with very limited primary 
education have returned to school in large numbers. This has placed further burdens 
on poorly paid and demoralized public primary school teachers who, in addition to 
teaching larger classes than normal, are having to cope with teaching children with 
enormous differences in age. For example, the recent school census found that 85 
percent of the students in Grade 1 were 8 to 20 years old, in contrast to the normal age 
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of 6 to 7 years. Furthermore, 50 percent of these children were aged between 11 and 
20 years old.
221
 
 
3.4 Restrictions to the RtE during poverty 
Does poverty – in its essence the lack of sufficient resources – justify limitations to the 
right to primary education? 
3.4.1 Limitations 
The limitations clause in art. 4 is an acknowledgement that no norms are absolute and is 
intended for “where rights [collide and] where the exigencies of state-administered 
socioeconomic welfare programs might necessitate limitations on the provision of benefits 
or other entitlements; limitations different in kind from those already contained in Article 
2(1).”222 Can poverty justify measures limiting the right to free and compulsory primary 
education, beyond the restrictions imposed by progressive realization? The limitations 
clause contains four requirements which must be cumulatively satisfied: 
 
1. [A]s are determined by law 
The formulation is identical to that in the UDHR art. 29(2). This requires a legislative basis 
for any measure taken. Emergency laws, and possibly other domestic levels of norms, 
would satisfy the requirement by being statutory, but would also have to satisfy substantive 
standards.
223
  
 
2. [C]ompatible with the nature of these rights 
The nature of education can be found in ICESCR art. 13(1) and CRC art. 29. The core of a 
right can never be restricted, and any restriction “must be in accordance with the law, 
including international human rights standards, compatible with the nature of the rights 
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protected by the Covenant, in the interest of legitimate aims pursued.”224 Restrictions must 
therefore be “proportional, i.e. the least restrictive alternative must be adopted where 
several types of limitations are available. Even where such limitations on grounds of 
protecting public health are basically permitted, they should be of limited duration and 
subject to review.”225 
 
3. [S]olely for the purpose of promoting the “general welfare”  
The primary objective of the formulation was protection of the rights in the Covenant, not 
to permit limitations to a great extent. “General welfare” must thus be interpreted narrowly; 
the broad general definition of the term cannot be applied without close consideration. The 
instances where the right to education could be restricted for this purpose is similarly 
narrow. The assessment of whether a purpose is promoting the “general welfare” is to be 
judged by the CESCR, not left to the state’s discretion.226 
 
4. [I]n a democratic society 
This does not imply that a state must have a democratic system of government nor can a 
lack of democracy justify limitations. A limitation measure must be applied in such a 
manner as could be expected from a democratic society, understood as being consistent 
with the principles of the United Nations.
227 
Limitations to economic, social and cultural 
rights shall not be arbitrary or unreasonable or discriminatory,
228
 nor shall the clause “be 
interpreted or applied so as to jeopardize the essence of the right concerned.”229 
 
The CESCR has asserted that a “[s]tate party which closes a university or other educational 
institution on grounds such as national security or the preservation of public order has the 
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burden of justifying such a serious measure in relation to each of the elements identified in 
article 4.”230 Not providing education is detrimental to the general welfare of the 
population, and if one priority should not be compromised when allocating scarce 
resources, it is the provision of education. Promotion of human rights, one of the aims of 
education, and democracy, is contingent upon educated citizens, especially during 
emergencies. In short; it is unlikely that poverty will justify art. 4 limitations to the RtPE. 
3.4.2 Derogation 
The CESCR has stressed that even in “times of severe resource constraints whether caused 
by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors [there is an 
obligation to adopt] relatively low-cost targeted programmes”231 It is unlikely, barring a 
more pressing emergency occurring simultaneously, that poverty would satisfy the 
requirements for derogation based on the general principles of Force Majeur or 
Necessity.
232
 A famine would for instance be discussed in chapter 4, if natural causes 
created the situation, but if caused by the state’s neglect, these general principles would not 
exculpate the state. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Poverty is not an exceptional situation which easily justifies restrictions to the RtE. For any 
retrogressive measure to be justified, many obligations of both conduct and result must be 
fulfilled. These include, but are not limited to; adoption of a plan, a good faith effort, an 
objectively assessed budget allocation for education, benchmarking and reporting on 
progress. Many African states have never fulfilled their obligation to create a plan for 
primary education and report on the progress of implementation. This is a clear breach of 
the Covenant and a continuous obligation, which must be fulfilled.  
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4 The right to education during emergencies – natural disasters 
 
In 1998 hundreds of schools in Central America were damaged by Hurricane Mitch 
and many others were turned into shelters. In Aceh, Indonesia, 1,000 teachers were 
lost after the tsunami in 2004, and 50 per cent of schools were destroyed, leaving 
140,000 elementary students and 20,000 junior high school students with nowhere to 
study. The tsunami destroyed 112 schools in Sri Lanka.
233
 
 
Natural disasters epitomize the term emergency, and are a varied group of occurrences, 
ranging from the slow onset of a drought to the sudden event of a flood or an earth quake. 
They typically render an area incapable of handling even the most basic tasks for a certain 
amount of time and result in damaged infrastructure and loss of lives. According to the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, 90 per cent of those affected “live in States 
with limited capacity to cope with that impact.”234 Often, a state of emergency is declared 
with legal implications for various rights, including human rights and the RtPE. 
4.1 The content of state obligations 
A natural disaster often places a country in a precipitous and weakened resource situation. 
In the type situation described in the quotation above, educational infrastructure is 
destroyed, there is an absence of teachers, and for a time attending school is rendered 
impossible due to the circumstances. The available resources will often at first, at least for 
developing countries, be provided by the international community. These resources must be 
taken into account when evaluating whether or not the response is adequate. For analyzing 
state obligations during natural disasters, I will employ a tripartite timeline; what 
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obligations do states have to prepare for emergencies, during emergencies and during 
transition to normalcy. 
4.1.1 Obligations to plan for emergencies 
As described in chapter 3, the obligation to adopt a plan for primary education applies 
without exception. As the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education has mentioned, 
natural disasters happen more and more frequently.
235
 There is a prohibition, understood 
from the obligation to progressively realize the RtE, on deliberate retrogressive measures. 
Involuntary retrogression is also forbidden, unless the state can justify its maximum good 
use of resources or exculpation from responsibility based on e.g. Force Majeur. A logical 
consequence of this is an obligation to plan for emergencies which have a relatively high 
probability of occurring. A failure to plan would deprive the state of the argument that the 
retrogression – or retrogressive measures – was an unfortunate result which occurred in 
spite of a good faith effort to use maximum available resources. The state will thus not 
satisfy the burden of proof requirements
236
 and will be in violation of the Covenant. 
 
An exceptional occurrence like the 2004 tsunami can perhaps not be planned for, but many 
emergencies are more predictable and appear slower, such as floods. Earth quakes happen 
with regular frequency, droughts are cyclical and floods happen yearly. If the state knows 
the likelihood of an emergency occurring is high, it should be required to have a response – 
mainly an obligation of conduct; to provide temporary measures. As a school year is 
recommended as consisting of 180 days, there is also the possibility of compensating for 
time spent without facilities. This obligation can be inferred from the element of 
adaptability, in that education should “adapt to the needs of changing societies and 
communities and respond to the needs of students.”237  
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The obligation to adopt legislative measures should also impose a clear obligation to 
recognize and protect the RtE in the domestic legal system, including the express right to 
education during emergencies. The General Assembly, in 2009, adopted a resolution 
emphasizing that there is a right to education during emergencies, and that education 
should be part of the humanitarian response, and include risk assessment and disaster 
preparedness.
238
 It also urged states to factor disaster risk and safety considerations “into all 
phases of the planning, design, construction and reconstruction of educational facilities.”239 
4.1.2 Obligations during emergencies 
When natural disasters occur, a state of emergency will often follow and impact the 
enjoyment of human rights. Specific derogation measures are not permitted under the four 
legal bases, but restrictions to rights could be possible under ICESCR art. 4 and based on 
general principles of law. The RtE could also be adversely affected by legitimate 
derogation from other rights. 
4.1.2.1 Restrictions to the RtE during emergencies 
Where an earth quake has destroyed a school building or a volcano threatens to cover a city 
in lava, common sense and pragmatism calls for an evacuation and as a consequence, 
children not receiving an education. The same applies if an infectious disease threatens to 
cause an epidemic.
240
 Measures must be weighed against the consequences for the rights it 
infringes upon, and must be proportional.
241
 Acute emergency situations do not fit well 
with the understanding of human rights violations. In the midst of an emergency, complete 
suspension – or non-fulfillment – of rights may be permitted, for a short period of time, 
before the transition to normalcy must resume. A “temporary closure of an educational 
institution due to an earthquake, for instance, would be a circumstance beyond the control 
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of the State”,242 and the correct approach is viewing the situation as a conflict of norms, 
where the protection of e.g the right to life, takes precedent over the RtE. The question is, 
under which rules can such action be legal? And where are the lines to be drawn between 
legal and illegal action? 
 
I - Limitations 
The CESCR specifically addressed the RtE in emergencies in General Comment no. 13. It 
stated that “a State party which closes a university or other educational institution on 
grounds such as national security or the preservation of public order has the burden of 
justifying such a serious measure in relation to each of the elements identified in article 
4.”243 The CESCR thus seems to view grounds such as “national security or the 
preservation of public order” as valid grounds under art. 4. The provision allows limitations 
which are “compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”. The scope of art. 4 therefore seems 
to also cover many situations which would also be covered by derogation provisions in 
other treaties, but any measure must fulfill the four requirements described in chapter 3.4.1. 
Where consequences are more severe, Necessity or Force Majeur are more likely to be 
asserted as grounds for a state’s failure to fulfill its obligations. 
 
II – Force Majeur and Necessity 
 
As described in chapter 2.3.3 Force Majeure applies where the state is unable to fulfill 
obligations, while Necessity applies where the state takes conscious but necessary action. 
The Limburg Principles acknowledge that “factors beyond [the state’s] reasonable control 
may adversely affect its capacity to implement particular rights.”244 During natural 
disasters the inability to protect and fulfill rights is the most likely scenario, with Force 
Majeur the most probable justification. According to the Special Rapporteur on the 
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Independence of Judges and Lawyers; "the worst violations of the right to education occur 
[...] during the period from early response to an emergency to the initial stages of 
reconstruction".
245
 This highlights how crucial the temporal factor is in protecting the RtE. 
Even where obligations are temporarily suspended on legitimate grounds of Force Majeur 
or Necessity, they quickly resume, imposing continuous and new obligations on the state, 
when the grounds have ceased. In acute emergencies, temporary evacuations and closing of 
schools would be justified on this basis,
246
 however, no “state of emergency may remain in 
force for longer than is strictly necessary.”247 
4.1.3 Obligations during transition to normalcy 
At some point there is an obligation to rebuild, and one must make a reassessment of the 
resource situation. It is not automatic that this coincides with the formal lifting of the state 
of emergency. The new resource situation triggers the continuing obligation to make a plan 
for primary education, and set benchmarks for how to reach them.
248
 This must be done 
“within two years of a subsequent change in circumstances which has led to the 
nonobservance of the relevant obligation.”249 According to a questionnaire from the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education; “the period for resuming educational activities 
varies between 24 hours and two months. However, it can be observed that reintegration 
and resumption of school are not a priority for all countries, even though they are vital for 
educational development and for the continuity of education in emergency situations.”250 
When the acute disaster is over, the situation is often practically the same as described in 
chapter 3: poverty.
251
 The state must then reassess the resource situation and adopt a new 
plan with benchmarks reflecting the new situation. The emergency is in no way a 
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justification for not fulfilling this continuous obligation; it applies, particularly to such 
situations.
252
 
4.2 Conclusions 
Natural disasters are unpredictable, heterogeneous and have been occurring more and more 
frequently in recent years. Each situation requires its own tailored response. The Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education has highlighted in his report on education in 
emergencies from 2008 that “[e]ducation, a basic human right, is frequently found to be 
interrupted, delayed or even denied during the reconstruction process and early response to 
emergencies.”253 He has also recommended that general educational programs should 
“include specific measures for continuity of education at all levels and during all the phases 
of the emergency. Such a plan should include training for the teachers in various aspects of 
emergency situations”.254 In short; an emergency situation may justify temporary non-
fulfillment of the RtPE, however, all the obligations described in chapter 3 apply in full as 
soon as the grounds for restrictions are lifted. 
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5 The right to education during armed conflict 
 
Long years of civil war, combined with constant political instability, have taken a 
heavy toll on the education sector in Liberia. In terms of infrastructure, an estimated 
80 percent of schools were destroyed. During the short window of peace in the late 
90s, some reconstruction took place and enrolment almost doubled. However, between 
2001 and 2003, the conflict re-emerged and further destruction and damage took 
place. In [a 2003-04-study…] 20 percent of schools had been completely destroyed, 
while many of the remaining 80 percent were in urgent need of repair.
255
 
 
According to the The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education “half the children who 
receive no education live in countries where there is or has recently been armed conflict 
and in some of those countries, net school enrolment is below 50 per cent. Recent estimates 
put the figure at 39 million children.”256 
 
During conflict situations, respecting and protecting civil and political rights often receives 
priority. Fulfillment of other rights is considered less pressing, something the limited 
priority afforded to education in humanitarian response is evidence of.
257 
As the quotation 
shows, conflict also severely impacts the resources available to education, both by 
destroying facilities, limiting the availability of teachers
258
 and by diverting resources to 
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war time production. It also creates vulnerable groups such as refugees and IDPs, and 
exposes woman and children to dangers such as sexualized violence.  
 
Before analyzing what obligations states have during armed conflict, it is conducive to 
describe specific conflict related protection measures in the four legal bases, then some 
explicit non-derogable prohibitions which indirectly protect the right to education, and 
finally positive protection of the RtE in IHL. 
5.1 Conflict related protection from the four legal bases 
Legal theory has debated the extent to which the CRC applies during conflict.
259
 It is 
considered to protect children to a greater extent than the ICESCR during emergencies. Art. 
38(1) ensures respect for IHL applicable to them “in armed conflicts which are relevant to 
the child.”260 The provision does not separate between internal and international armed 
conflict and should therefore apply to both as the treaty applies at all times. This could be 
interpreted as meaning that states which have not ratified the Geneva Conventions
261
 and 
Protocols – rules of IHL262 – are still bound by all applicable humanitarian laws which are 
relevant to the child – during both internal and international conflicts.263 The Children’s 
Charter confirms this principle in art. 22(1).
264
 
 
CRC art. 38(3) forbids the recruitment of children under 15 years of age into armed forces, 
while art. 38(2) imposes on states an obligation to “take all feasible measure” to ensure 
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children under 15 do not take part in hostilities.
265
 The Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (‘Optional 
Protocol CRC’) raises this limit to 18 years for those 143 states which have ratified it.266 
The Children’s Charter art. 22(2) mirrors these rules but as a child is defined as every 
person under 18, it raises the age for at least the 45 states parties.
267
 These are important 
rules as: 
 
[i]n 2008, the UN estimated that more than 250,000 children remained in the ranks of 
armed forces or groups. Voluntary or forced recruitment of children from school, or 
en route to or from school, by armed groups or security forces for combat or forced 
labour from 2006 to 2009 was reported in [18 countries, 7 of which in Africa].
268
 
 
CRC art. 38(4) obligates states to “take all feasible measures” to protect the civilian 
population, and particularly children “who are affected by armed conflict.” It does not 
make specific reference to internal conflicts, but the Children’s Charter extends this 
principle specifically “to children in situations of internal armed conflicts, tension and 
strife.”269 Possible objections to the lowering of standards through the use of “feasible 
measures”, unlike the absolute standards in IHL, are resolved through art. 41, which sets 
the CRC as a minimum standard.
 270
 It is likely that in regards to children and education, all 
rules of IHL apply, also during internal conflicts, although in practice it is far from certain 
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that all parties to conflicts will be willing to accept these obligations. In the following the 
analysis of state obligations will be based on the assumption that IHL applies as described. 
5.2 International Humanitarian law (IHL) 
International Humanitarian Law applies to varying degree, depending on whether the 
conflict is international or internal. It also applies to a larger extent if states are parties to 
the four Geneva Conventions and the two protocols, in which case, they are bound by all 
these provisions, not just those considered codification of customary law.
271
 
 
The severity of situations of armed tension can be divided in three. Internal disturbances 
and civil unrest is not protected by IHL. When these situations evolve so that the life of the 
nation is threatened, it reaches the level of internal armed conflict where some IHL rules 
apply. Where two or more states are involved there is an international armed conflict.
272
 
5.2.1 Internal armed conflict 
During internal armed conflicts art. 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies 
together with Additional Protocol II art. 4 and other customary rules.
273
 
5.2.2 International armed conflict 
The four Geneva Conventions and its first protocol contain rules for the protection of 
different victims of war and apply to conflicts where at least two states are involved. Art. 2 
common to the Conventions is considered customary international law and is also binding 
on non-parties, along with other customary rules of conduct.
274
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I will first examine the relevant rules of international humanitarian law which indirectly 
respect and protect the RtE, and the specific IHL provisions which protect it. These 
obligations are incumbent on both parties to a conflict. 
5.2.2.1 Prohibited behavior – restrictions on conduct 
The intentional targeting of buildings dedicated to education is a war crime.
275
 In addition 
the conduct of war must conform to a number of customary rules. The principle of 
Distinction requires that distinction is made between military and civilian objectives.
276
 
The principle of Proportionality prohibits attacks which are “excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 277 The principle of Military Necessity 
requires that designated protected areas are not targeted unless absolutely necessary.
278
 
Together these principles sett barriers for the type of behavior which is considered legal 
during jus in bello, and formally protects children of primary school age and institutions of 
education to a large extent. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon in practice for contending 
parties to use educational buildings for their operations. 
5.2.2.2 Positive rules of IHL protecting the RtE during international conflicts 
Additional protocol I art. 77(1) requires that children are the object of special respect and 
protection from assault. The must receive the care and aid they require. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention protects the RtE of orphans, separated and interned children. Art. 24 ensures 
that children under 15, “who are orphaned or are separated from their families as a result of 
the war” have their education “facilitated in all circumstances.” During internment the 
detaining power shall encourage inter alia educational pursuits, and children “shall be 
allowed to attend schools either within the place of internment or outside.”279 Internees 
shall also be allowed to “receive, by post or by any other means, individual parcels or 
                                                 
275
 ICC Statute art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv). 
276
 See Henckaerts (2009) p. 3 and 25 and Additional Protocol I art. 48. 
277
 Ibid p. 46 and Additional Protocol I art. 51. 
278
 Ibid p. 127 and Additional protocol I art. 52. 
279
 Geneva Convention IV art. 94. 
 58 
collective shipments containing [...] books and objects of a devotional, educational or 
recreational character which may meet their needs.”280 
5.3 State obligations during conflict 
During conflict, state obligations are inextricably linked to the possible grounds for 
restricting rights. A conflict situation can be viewed along a tripartite timeline; hostilities, 
occupation and re-construction. 
5.3.1 Obligations during hostilities 
Conflict will often lead to states of emergency, but unlike during natural disasters, laws of 
humanitarian law will, as a general rule, apply as non-derogable lex specialis rules. A 
measure in violation of the abovementioned rules can thus not be exculpated based on 
Necessity or Force Majeur.
281
 We are thus left with the narrow possibility that education, 
for short periods of time can be derogated from on these grounds, where there is no IHL-
protection. Where an invading army or an expected bombing requires an evacuation 
restrictions would be temporarily justified, otherwise normal obligations apply. 
 
The ICJ noted in the Wall-opinion that restrictions on the enjoyment of economic social 
and cultural rights – or limitations – must be “solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society”, and proportional.282 As seen in chapter 4, limiting 
the right to education to save the lives of the same children and rights holders is justified 
under art. 4. 
 
The Special Rapporteur believes that “security in schools forms part of the human right to 
education. Security means not only physical, psychological and moral safety but also a 
right to be educated without interruption in conditions conducive to the formation of 
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knowledge and character development.”283 National security is a legitimate reason for 
limiting rights under the ICESCR, but it is difficult to see how a limitation on the RtE 
could be “taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political 
independence against force or threat of force.”284 In instances such as these, the rules of 
IHL specifically protect education. State obligations are thus not influenced by the conflict. 
5.3.2 Obligations during occupation 
During occupation, there is an obligation on the occupying power to “facilitate the proper 
working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children”285 with the 
cooperation of the national and local authorities. The ICJ has clarified that human rights 
obligations, including the RtE, apply where a state exercises territorial jurisdiction. “Thus 
Article 14 makes provision for transitional measures in the case of any State which ‘at the 
time of becoming a party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other 
territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge’.”286 A 
violation of the right to education can thus be made by the state of residence, but also by an 
aggressor or occupying state.
287
 If local institutions are inadequate, the occupying power 
shall “make arrangements for the maintenance and education”288 of separated and orphaned 
children. The occupying state should be bound by its own benchmarks and required to 
extend it to occupied territories. If infrastructure, teachers and material has been destroyed, 
the obligation to adopt a new plan reflecting the new resource situation, within two years, 
applies. Non-discrimination applies in full, and is particularly important when two 
nationalities have just fought a war. 
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5.3.3 Obligations post-conflict – during reconstruction  
CRC art. 39 obligates states to “take all appropriate measures to promote physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration” of children who are victims of inter alia 
conflict. Education should be included among these measures.  
 
During a rebuilding phase – post conflict – a state of normalcy is resuming. These 
situations may however be varied, in resources, damage of infrastructure, and whether the 
occupying state is still in control. At some point humanitarian law ceases to apply, and 
there will be no legitimate grounds for upholding a state of emergency. The obligation to 
adopt a new plan
289
 with benchmarks is incumbent within two years. The more the situation 
resembles a situation of normalcy, the closer we get to the discussion of state obligations in 
chapter 3: poverty. 
5.3.4 The obligation to protect vulnerable groups during and after conflict 
ICESCR art. 2(2) imposes an immediate obligation not to discriminate – which also applies 
in full during conflict – on account of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”290 Emergency 
situations, including armed conflict, often increases inequality and discrimination for 
marginalized groups;
291
 including woman, refugees and IDPs.
292
 While the two former 
have specific treaties addressing them as a group,
293
 the situation for IDPs has until recently 
mainly been addressed by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
294
 The African 
                                                 
289
 ICESCR art. 14. 
290
 See also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’) art. 
5(v). 
291
 Muñoz (2008) [88]. 
292
 CESCR General Comment 20 [34]. 
293
 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW’) art. 10 
and Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’) art. 22. See also General Comment 
13 [31]. 
294
 See Principle 23. Additional Protocol I art. 78(2) is also relevant for IDPs. 
 61 
Human Rights system incorporates a wider definition of refugees
295
 and the Children’s 
Charter extends refugee protection to internally displaced children, whether their 
displacement is caused by “natural disaster, internal armed conflicts, civil strife, breakdown 
of economic and social order or howsoever caused.”296 In addition, the African Union, in 
2009, concluded the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa (‘Kampala Convention’). It has yet to receive the required 15 ratification 
to enter into force, but is based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
297
 thus 
giving local legitimacy to this important soft law document, in an African context. 
 
IDPs are still resident in their state of nationality, and are entitled to the same protection as 
any other non-combatant in a conflict zone
298
. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Education has noted that IDPs are “disproportionately denied the right to education [and 
that] number of internally displaced persons without the right to education is generally 90 
per cent.”299 
 
Africa is home to more than 11 million IDPs – or 40 per cent of the world total.300 
Currently the average length of displacement is 17 years.
301
 Denying refugees and IDPs 
education could thus lead to a whole generation not acquiring basic skills. The Kampala 
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Convention which protects the right to education,
302
 and an added focus on the somewhat 
neglected
303
 Children’s Charter, could be employed to better their situation in the future. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The right to education is protected well through IHL, and the CRC and Children’s Charter 
extends this protection to situations of instability and generalized violence. Except for in 
acute situations, where Force Majeur of Necessity would allow for restrictions, the 
obligation to provide primary education applies in full. This does not hide the fact that 
there are many practical obstacles, of security and concerning the general issue of 
resources. Emergencies and conflict, like poverty, still require state parties to fulfill clear 
obligations of conduct and result, which should lead to full realization of the RtPE; free and 
compulsory for all. 
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6 Final conclusions and observations 
This thesis has shown that although not every child in Africa can claim the right to a free 
and compulsory place in school today, this is largely due to states not fulfilling their 
obligations. Many states have not fulfilled the clear result obligation to adopt a plan for 
primary education within two years and report on its progressive implementation. This is a 
mandatory and continuous requirement and not subject to progressive realization. 
 
There is a coherent right to primary education for children in Africa, and beyond 
progressive realization, it is only subject to narrow and brief restrictions. The type 
situations are causally linked, with a common core; poverty and lack of resources. State 
obligations are in essence very much the same during all three situations. In emergencies 
the CRC and African Children’s Charter give additional protection, while in general, the 
affirmation of the RtE in an African context through regional treaties, also contributes to 
local legitimacy.
304
 
 
States which have not adopted a plan for primary education should do so immediately, so 
the system of indicators and benchmarks – obligations of conduct and result – can lead to 
the result of full realization; and free and compulsory primary education for all. 
 
Recommendations to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
 
 The CESCR should define fewer, and less complicated rights-based indicators, for 
measuring compliance.
305
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 Initiatives like the EFA campaign focus on the primary obstacle to the fulfillment of 
the right to primary education – resources. The emphasis in ICESCR art. 2(1) on 
international assistance should be used to highlight that aid earmarked for education 
creates a binding obligation on states to factor these resources into their budget, as a 
basis for the evaluation of a good faith effort. An objective minimum of six per cent 
of the state budget should be allocated for education 
 
By insisting that states comply with their clear and unambiguous obligations, as identified 
in this thesis, the likelihood of achieving universal primary education, has a greater chance 
of succeeding. 
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Annex I – Substantive Universal Legal Bases for the RtPE 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
Article 26  
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary 
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.   
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and 
shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.   
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR ) 
Article 13 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. 
They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to 
participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the 
full realization of this right: 
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all 
 B 
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching 
staff shall be continuously improved. 
 
Article 14 
Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not 
been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction 
compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out 
and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable 
number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of 
charge for all. 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
Article 28 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving 
this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out 
rates. 
 
Article 29 
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: 
(a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to 
their fullest potential; 
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, 
language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the 
country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her 
own; 
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(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, 
ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; 
(e) The development of respect for the natural environment. 
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Annex II – Substantive Regional Legal Bases for the RtPE 
African Charter on Human and proples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) 
Article 17 
1. Every individual shall have the right to education. 
 
African Charter on the Rights and welfare of the Child (Children’s Charter) 
Article 11: Education 
1. Every child shall have the right to an education. 
2. The education of the child shall be directed to: 
(a) the promotion and development of the child's personality, talents and mental and 
physical abilities to their fullest potential; 
(b) fostering respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms with particular reference 
to those set out in the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples' 
rights and international human rights declarations and conventions; 
(c) the preservation and strengthening of positive African morals, traditional values and 
cultures; 
(d) the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding tolerance, dialogue, mutual respect and friendship among all peoples ethnic, 
tribal and religious groups; 
(e) the preservation of national independence and territorial integrity; 
(f) the promotion and achievements of African Unity and Solidarity; 
(g) the development of respect for the environment and natural resources; 
(h) the promotion of the child's understanding of primary health care. 
3. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures with a view to 
achieving the full realization of this right and shall in particular: 
(a) provide free and compulsory basic education; 
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(b) encourage the development of secondary education in its different forms and to 
progressively make it free and accessible to all; 
(c) make the higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity and ability by every 
appropriate means; 
(d) take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out 
rates; 
(e) take special measures in respect of female, gifted and disadvantaged children, to ensure 
equal access to education for all sections of the community. 
